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Abstract
We have experimentally tested a theory of bounded rational behav-
ior in a “lemon market”. It provides an explanation for the observation
that real world players successfully conclude transactions when perfect
rationality predicts a market collapse. We analyzed two diﬀerent market
designs: complete and partial market collapse. Our empirical observations
deviate substantially from these theoretical predictions. In both markets,
the participants traded more than theoretically predicted. Thus, the ac-
tual outcome is closer to eﬃciency than the theoretical prediction. Even
after 20 repetitions of the ﬁrst market constellation, the number of trans-
actions did not drop to zero.
Our bounded rationality approach to explain these observations starts
with the insight that perfect rationality would require the players to per-
form an inﬁnite number of iterative reasoning steps. Bounded rational
players, however, carry out only a limited number of such iterations. We
have determined the iteration type of the players independently from their
market behavior. A signiﬁcant correlation exists between iteration types
and observed price oﬀers.
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11 Introduction
Asymmetric information can cause ineﬃcient market outcomes. This is the
main insight of Akerlof (1970).1 Akerlof’s famous example was a highly stylized
market for used cars in which cars of two diﬀerent qualities exist: some cars
have high quality, others are “lemons”. Eﬃciency requires all cars to be traded.
However, under the assumption that the sellers know the quality of their car,
whereas the buyers are unable to observe the true quality of a speciﬁc car, an
adverse selection eﬀect may cause the market to collapse entirely (under the
worst circumstances). Real-world players, however, usually tend to successfully
complete at least some transactions in lemon markets.
We have run a series of experiments in which the participants had to trade
in a lemon market. The prices oﬀered by the uninformed buyers were much
higher than those predicted by the theory. Therefore, the amount of traded
goods exceeded the theoretical prediction as well. Thus, the empirical extent of
the market failure was smaller than expected.
One way to explain such behavior requires relaxing the assumption that
players are perfectly rational. Many models of bounded rationality ex-
ist.2 Stahl/Wilson (1995, 128) have deﬁned and tested ﬁve bounded rational
archetypes of players that can be distinguished with respect to their “model of
other players and their ability to identify optimal choices given their priors”.
They point out that two ways exist how players can deviate from the classical
theory of decision-making under uncertainty: in their priors about other players
or in their capability of choosing best responses given their priors.
The concept of bounded rationality that we propose as an explanation of the
observed behavior in our experiment follows the latter approach. Moreover, it
draws on the theory of iterative reasoning.3 The equilibrium result in Akerlof’s
lemon market requires the players to compute an inﬁnite number of iterative
steps. Bounded rationality, however, allows a decision-maker to perform only a
limited number of iterations.
Note that our approach should be distinguished from the one in Nagel (1995).
Her paper describes a guessing game experiment which has been executed with
thousands of participants worldwide.4 Participants are asked to write down (in
private) a ﬁgure between 0 and 100. These ﬁgures are collected, the average
is computed, and the participant whose ﬁgure is closest to a fraction of the
average receives a prize. In the unique Nash equilibrium all participants write
down zero.5 As in our experiment, the derivation of this Nash equilibrium
1This seminal paper has inspired an enormous body of literature, see e.g. Wilson (1989)
for an introduction and overview.
2See, e.g., Conslik (1996) for an overview.
3Camerer (2003), chapter 5 provides an introduction into iterative dominance; section 5.6
explains the “levels of reasoning” concept.
4See Thaler (1997), Nagel et al (1999), and Selten/Nagel (1998).
5Nagel (1995, 1314). The famous “beauty contest” of Keynes (1936, 156) implicitly as-
sumed a factor equal to one. This case clearly leads to multiple Nash equilibria. For a factor
greater than one, there are two Nash equilibria, see Nagel (1995, 1314) for details.
2also rests on an inﬁnite number of iteration steps, and the vast majority of the
participants in that experiment does not play the Nash equilibrium strategy.
Nagel explains that observation with the assumption that real world players
make only a limited number of iteration steps, which appears to be very similar
to our experiment on the ﬁrst glance. However, her paper follows the ﬁrst rather
than the second approach introduced by Stahl/Wilson (1995). In her theory,
the player under scrutiny is not assumed to be limited in his abilities to act
rationally. She rather assumes that players have false assumptions concerning
the type of their peers. If a player thinks that all other players perform only
two iteration steps, then it is the perfectly rational choice to limit oneself to
three steps.
While Nagel’s theory refers to beliefs about other players’ types, our theory
deals with the abilities of the individual player under scrutiny. Thus, her theory
does not describe the respective player as being bounded rational. However,
there is one similarity between these two approaches. According to Nagel’s
results, players are either “type” 1, 2, 3, or inﬁnity.6 This terminology reﬂects
that people assume their peers to perform either 0, 1, or 2 iteration steps (and
try to be one step ahead), or they assume that the others are perfectly rational
(inﬁnite number of steps). The latter behavior is typical for participants who
have enjoyed some training in game theory. In our experiment, we also ﬁnd that
players are either extremely limited (type 0 or 1) or elaborate (type 2 or greater),
an observation that induced us to distinguish only these three categories of
iteration types.
Another example that belongs into the ﬁrst category of bounded rationality
approaches is the experiment of Beard/Beil (1994): player 1 can choose L and
gain 9.75 (his opponent receives 3). Alternatively, he can choose R and put
player 2 on the move. If 2 now acts rationally, then he chooses r, which brings
him 5 (and 10 for player 1). If he fails to do so, he only receives 3 (and player
1 gets only 4.75). The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is played only if 1
is convinced that 2 will indeed act selﬁshly. If 1 holds a belief that 2 is not
suﬃciently rational, then the weakly dominated Nash equilibrium of this game
is played. The main ﬁndings of this experiment were reproduced by Goeree/Holt
(2001).
There is another diﬀerence between our paper on the one hand, and the
experiments of Nagel (1995) and Beard/Beil (1994) on the other: in these pa-
pers, data evaluation is limited to the behavior observed. The driving force of
their approach, i.e, the beliefs of the player under scrutiny with regard to his
opponents’ rationality, has to be determined from the observed behavior of the
participants. We have evaluated two distinct data sets which were generated
independently from each other. The one set consists of the observable behavior,
i.e., the oﬀered prices and traded quantities. The source of the other set is
a questionnaire. We asked the participants to describe their line of reasoning
brieﬂy in words after each round. The evaluation of these written statements led
to a categorization of the participants into “iteration types”. We have found a
6This explains the title of the paper by Nagel et. al. (1999).
3correlation between the iteration types and the oﬀered prices. Thus, the concept
of limited iterative reasoning does not only theoretically explain the observed
behavior; this theory is also supported by the data.
The idea of iterative reasoning has been tested in numerous experiments.7
The “centipede game” of Rosenthal (1981) has raised particular interest. It is
subgame perfect to ﬁnish the game already at the ﬁrst node, but when both
players stay in the game for further rounds, this increases the mutual payoﬀ.
McKelvey/Palfrey (1992) have discovered that players rarely leave the game
at early stages. However, the probability is increasing with the number of
nodes played. This behavior could be explained by a limited ability for iterated
reasoning. As in our experiment, perfect rationality requires a player to perform
a high (if not inﬁnite) number of reasoning steps, but each additional step of
iterative reasoning decreases the payoﬀ.
If the agents in a lemon market are bounded rational, then the predicted out-
come would not be as ineﬃcient as under the assumption of perfect rationality.
Bounded rational participants thus generate a greater cooperation rent than
in the Nash equilibrium predicted under the assumption of perfect rationality.
One should, however, be aware that these transactions do not necessarily have to
be bilaterally beneﬁcial. If an uninformed buyer in a lemon market concludes a
transaction on the basis of false expectations, then he may well be worse oﬀ than
without the transaction. If such a transaction is “welfare enhancing”, then this
term refers to Kaldor-Hicks improvements rather than to Pareto improvements.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we introduce
two versions of the Akerlof model. Under the assumption of perfect rationality,
the predicted outcome is a complete market collapse in the ﬁrst parameter
setting, whereas in the second only some units of low quality are predicted
to be traded. Players of bounded rationality, according to our concept, are
predicted to conclude a greater number of transactions under both of the two
parameter settings. The lower the reasoning type of a buyer (as derived from
the written self-description in the questionnaire), the higher the oﬀered price.
The lower the degree of rationality among the buyers, the higher is the number
of transactions we expect to take place.
In section 3, we describe our experiment. In the parameter constellation
for which a complete collapse was predicted, the number of transactions was
smaller than in the market with partial collapse. Thus, a “lemon” eﬀect was still
observable. However, under both parameter constellations the participants have
completed much more transactions than the perfect rationality-based model
predicts. However, the number of concluded transactions was still ineﬃcient.
Our bounded rationality approach - based on the theory of iterative reason-
ing - would predict such a behavior if buyers are active who perform only a
limited number of reasoning steps. We have determined the participants’ iter-
ative reasoning types from their written statements. Then, we have compared
these types with the observable prices. We have found a signiﬁcant correla-
tion between iteration types and observed price oﬀers. This ﬁrst part of the
7See, e.g., Schotter/Weigelt/Wilson (1994).
4experiment is described in sections 3.1 to 3.3.
We have run an additional experiment, the results of which are presented in
section 3.4, to test whether the transactions observed are due to a ﬁrst-round
eﬀect (in other words: whether experienced players learn to let the market
collapse). Participants who did not take part in the ﬁrst part of the experi-
ment repeatedly played one of the two market constellations. According to our
observations, the oﬀer prices declined with the number of rounds played, but
remained signiﬁcantly above the price that was predicted for perfectly rational
players.
Section 4 concludes the article with a discussion of the possible implication of
our results for economic policy, in particular for the regulation of lemon markets.
2 Adverse Selection
2.1 Setup
This section presents the two versions of the Akerlof model that we have tested
in a series of experiments. The results of these experiments are reported in the
subsequent section. The two versions of the model are parameterized in a way
that, under the assumption of perfect rationality, two diﬀerent equilibrium out-
comes are derived: in one setting, the market is expected to collapse completely;
in the other setting some trade is predicted to take place. Both equilibria are
ineﬃcient, since eﬃciency would require all units in the market to be traded.
Consider a market in which a good is traded that may assume diﬀerent
qualities. We assume the quality to be uniformly distributed over the interval
[0;1], and we denote the actual quality of a speciﬁc unit as Q. The actual quality
is relevant for the agents’ valuation of the car. Two groups of agents are active
in this market:
² (Potential) sellers, each of whom owns one unit of the good and knows the
true quality of this unit. The valuation of the sellers is denoted as a(Q),
with a(Q) = ¯Q (¯ > 0).
² (Potential) buyers who do not own the good. They are unable to observe
the true quality of a certain car, but they know the distribution of the
quality. Their valuation is denoted as n(Q) = ° + ±Q.
We assume ° ¸ 0 and ± > ¯: the buyers’ valuation for each quality level
Q > 0 exceeds the sellers’. In a situation of symmetric information, the eﬃcient
outcome could easily be achieved. Assume that both market sides are fully
informed about the quality of a respective unit. For each quality level, there is
a buyer whose willingness to pay exceeds the respective seller’s willingness to
accept, and the market will be cleared. Assume, on the other hand, that both
market sides are uninformed, but do know the distribution of the quality. Then
each buyer and seller would agree to buy a speciﬁc unit for a price between their
valuation of the average quality (which is 0.5).
5However, this result is not predicted under asymmetric information about
the goods’ quality. We assume the following interaction structure: each buyer
makes a price oﬀer. The oﬀer is randomly assigned to a speciﬁc seller who then
decides whether to accept the oﬀer or not. If the seller accepts, then a contract
is concluded and the unit of the commodity is traded. If the seller refuses the
oﬀer, then no transaction takes place. Denote the possible reactions of the seller
as ¿ = 0 if he refuses the buyer’s oﬀer, and ¿ = 1 if he accepts.
Now we derive the payoﬀs of the two parties, written as Πi, with i = b for
buyers and i = s for sellers. The initial endowment of the players is Vi ¸ 0.
If a certain buyer submits a price oﬀer p, which is randomly allocated to a
certain seller, then the seller receives Πs = Vs + (1 ¡ ¿)¯Q + ¿p, which equals
Vs +¯Q+¿(p¡¯Q). Obviously, it is rational to accept for a seller if, and only
if, p > ¯Q. The decision problem of a seller, if faced with a price oﬀer p by a
certain buyer, is rather simple.
The buyer’s payoﬀ accrues to Πb = Vb + ¿(° + ±Q ¡ p) if the transaction
is concluded. An uninformed buyer faces a much more complicated decision
problem. He should maximize the expected gain from successfully closing a
transaction, namely °+±Q¡p by choosing an appropriate price oﬀer p, however
without knowing the true quality Q.
2.2 Perfect rationality
Any price oﬀer p · ¯ divides the support of the quality Q into three subsets:8
² Q < n¡1(p): the oﬀer is accepted, i.e. ¿(p) = 1, but the resulting payoﬀ
leads to a loss for the submitting buyer;
² n¡1(p) < Q < a¡1(p): the oﬀer is accepted and brings a proﬁt for the
buyer;
² Q > a¡1(p): the oﬀer is rejected, or ¿(p) = 0.
The assumption a(Q) = ¯Q implies a¡1(p) = p=¯. The buyer’s expected
payoﬀ, conditional on his submitted price oﬀer, accrues to
EΠb(p) = Vb +
Z p=¯
0






A perfectly rational buyer chooses his price oﬀer in order to maximize
EΠb(p). In the subsequent analysis, as well as in the experiment, we distin-
guish two diﬀerent parameter constellations regarding n(Q):
1. n(Q) = ±Q (hence ° = 0) and ± > ¯,
8Price oﬀers greater than ¯ are strictly dominated and can, therefore, be neglected: with
p = ¯, the price oﬀer would attract all possible qualities up to Q = 1. Hence, a higher price
oﬀer cannot make the buyer better oﬀ.
62. n(Q) = ° + ±Q with ° > 0 and ± = ¯.
In case 1, the valuations of both the sellers and the buyers start in the origin,
and the buyers’ valuation has greater slope. Case 2 is characterized by parallel
valuation curves with a constant distance. The following proposition derives the
optimal price oﬀer, denoted p¤, made by a perfectly rational decision maker.9
Proposition: Assume a lemon market in which the buyers’ valua-
tion of quality Q is n(Q) = ° + ±(Q) and the sellers’ valuation is
a(Q) = ¯Q, with ° ¸ 0 and ± ¸ ¯ > 0. Then
1. if ± · 2¯ is true, the optimal price oﬀer under parameter con-
stellation 1 (° = 0 and ± > ¯) is p¤ = 0,
2. if ± · 2¯ is true, the optimal price oﬀer under parameter con-
stellation 2 (° > 0 and ± = ¯) is p¤ = °,
3. if ± ¸ 2¯, the optimal price oﬀer is p¤ = ¯.
The result p¤ = 0 implies a complete market collapse: even though it would
be eﬃcient to trade all units in the market, asymmetric information makes the
buyers abstain from positive oﬀers, so no units are traded at all. In the other




The optimal choice demonstrated above can equivalently be derived by an iter-
ative reasoning process. Iterative reasoning, however, has the advantage that it
allows for modeling bounded rationality. Within the framework of this theory,
a perfectly rational decision-maker performs an inﬁnite number of reasoning
steps, whereas a bounded rational decision-maker is able to carry out only a
limited number of steps.
Let us ﬁrst consider a buyer who does not analyze the situation at all. He
picks his price oﬀer just by pure chance. To put it formally: this buyer performs
zero iteration steps. Another buyer might evaluate the situation a more elabo-
rate way: he knows that the unknown, true quality of the car he oﬀers a price
for is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. Thus, he would calculate with
an expected quality of 1/2. Such a buyer would oﬀer a price from the interval
between the sellers’ and his own valuation of this expected value. This buyer
performs the ﬁrst step of the iterative reasoning process.
The next buyer under scrutiny may realize that, even if he oﬀers the highest
possible value, i.e. his own valuation of the expected quality, there might be
some sellers who would refuse his oﬀer. Unfortunately, these are the sellers
9The proof of this proposition is conﬁned to the appendix.
7who own the highest qualities. If the buyer understands this, then the expected
quality of the good he will actually receive, conditional on his price oﬀer, is
smaller than the unconditional expected quality his price oﬀer was based on
after the ﬁrst step of reasoning. Therefore, this buyer will update his oﬀer,
which means bidding a lower price. A buyer who stops here has performed two
steps of iterative reasoning.
In the next reasoning step, the buyer may still be hesitant to actually make
the oﬀer he has derived yet. The reason for this reluctance can be derived out of
a similar reasoning: the lower the price oﬀer, the smaller the maximum quality
the buyer can expect to receive.
Let us denote the expected quality for a buyer who performs k steps of itera-
tive reasoning as EQk. We assume that such a player represents the distribution
of the quality by this expected value. The buyers’ maximum willingness to pay
is denoted as nk. It is determined by the expected quality EQk.
2.3.2 Complete market collapse
Let us examine the parameter constellation 1 (i.e., ° = 0 and ± > ¯). In case
of a buyer who performs only one step of iterative reasoning, the maximum
willingness to pay is n1 = n(EQ1) = ±=2. For a transaction to occur, a buyer
should make an oﬀer that exceeds the sellers’ valuation of the expected quality.
We denote the minimum oﬀer of this buyer as a1, with a1 = a(EQ1) = ¯=2.
We limit our focus to cases where n1 < ¯, which means ± < 2¯ in the present
parameter setting. This assumption implies that sellers with positive probability
exist who own a unit of high quality and can be expected to reject even the
highest oﬀer the buyer (after one step of reasoning) is willing to make. All
sellers who oﬀer quality greater than
Q1 = a¡1(n1) =
±
2¯
will prefer to refuse the oﬀer and leave the market. They keep their item for
themselves. Index 1 indicates that this is the maximum quality attracted by the
oﬀer of the buyer who is in step 1 of the iterative process. Figure 1 visualizes
EQ, n(EQ), Q1, and EQ1. The quality is shown on the horizontal axis, the
valuations by sellers and buyers, respectively, are shown on the vertical axis.
The upper diagonal curve represents the buyers’ valuation, n(Q), the lower one
represents the sellers’ valuation, a(Q).
Note that Q1 is smaller than 1, which is due to the assumption ± < 2¯. This
maximum quality is, simultaneously, the starting point for the second reasoning
step of a buyer. In this second step of the iterative reasoning process, a buyer
expects Q1 to be the highest quality that can actually be achieved in the market.
Therefore, the expected quality contingent on the maximal oﬀer during the ﬁrst
step of iterative reasoning is 0:5Q1 (which is smaller than 0.5). Thus, the buyer
has a maximum willingness to pay, contingent on his beliefs, that amounts to





















































a¡1(n1) = Q1 EQ1
n2 = ±Q1 =
±2
2¯
Due to the assumption ± < 2¯, this is smaller than n1. Obviously, Qk as
well as nk decrease with the number of iteration steps k > 0;k 2 I N. Therefore,
this iterative reasoning leads to lower price oﬀers, the higher the number of rea-
soning steps. For an inﬁnite number of steps, the buyer reaches the equilibrium
solution: perfect rational buyers oﬀer a zero price and no unit is traded. This is
the outcome of maximum ineﬃciency as compared to a situation with complete
information. In the asymmetric information equilibrium, the players realize zero
cooperation rent.
Bounded rational players, on the contrary, make only a limited number of
steps. The observation of a positive price oﬀer may reveal the respective seller’s
reasoning level. For any number of reasoning steps k > 0 a player performs, we
can deﬁne an interval [a(EQk¡1);nk] from which this player should choose his
price oﬀer. If he would oﬀer a price greater than nk, he would prefer its rejection;
if he bids a price below the corresponding valuation of the seller a¡1(EQk), the
buyer cannot expect this oﬀer to be accepted. Only an oﬀer within this interval
will - from the buyer’s point of view - be accepted and simultaneously beneﬁt
9him.
Thus, as long as the intervals for diﬀerent levels of reasoning do not intersect,
we can derive a buyer’s level from his price oﬀer. Note that the intervals tend to
overlap for higher values of k. Thus, this idea serves well to identify the lower
number of reasoning.
2.3.3 Partial market collapse
We now examine the second parameter constellation: ° > 0 and ± = ¯. Figure
2 demonstrates the situation of a decision-maker who performs one step of it-
erative reasoning. Such a buyer assumes an expected quality EQ = 1=2. Thus,
he should oﬀer a price between a(EQ) and n(EQ) = n1.












































In the second step, a buyer would realize that, even if he bids the highest
possible price for this expected quality, namely n(EQ1), some sellers holding a
unit of high quality would reject his oﬀer. The highest possible quality during
the ﬁrst reasoning step which a buyer may actually achieve is Q1 = a¡1(n1) =
(° + ¯)=2¯. Thus, in the second reasoning step, the buyer expected a quality
that equals Q1=2 = (° + ¯)=4¯.
As derived above, a perfectly rational and expected payoﬀ-maximizing buyer
would oﬀer p = °. In this case, only qualities below 1=3 would be traded. Thus,




In the following, the parameter constellation with complete market collapse is
labeled as (comp), and the one with partial collapse is named (part). In the
(comp) market, we assigned n(Q) = 4Q as the buyers’ valuation, and in the
(part) market the buyers valued quality with n(Q) = 1 + 3Q. The buyers’
valuation was ﬁxed as a(Q) = 3Q.
We chose four diﬀerent treatments that were run in 2002 and 2003 at Karl-
sruhe University, Germany:
² treatment A: [part1, comp2],
² treatment B: [comp1, part2],
² treatment C: [20 times comp],
² treatment D: [20 times part].
In treatments A and B, subjects played each (part) and (comp) for one round,
where the numbers 1 and 2 indicate the respective round each design was played.
In treatments C and D, to avoid the possibility of mere ﬁrst round eﬀects, 20
rounds of (comp) and (part) were played.10
248 students of Karlsruhe University participated in 18 experimental sessions
(ﬁve sessions for treatments A and B each, and four sessions for C and D each).
The group size ranged from 16 to 20 participants per session. Each of the
subjects participated in only one session. Most of the participants were studying
Business Engineering at the undergraduate level. At the time of the experiment,
none of them had enjoyed any formal training in contract theory.
Treatments A and B were conducted in a non-computerized way, i.e. we
used paper and pencil. Each experiment group was split in halves and randomly
assigned to two diﬀerent rooms. The participants in each of the rooms ﬁrst
acted as buyers (submitted price oﬀers to the other room), and then acted as
sellers (received price oﬀers from the other room). Subjects took over both roles
because sellers only had to make the simple decision whether or not a certain
price oﬀer exceeded the valuation of their unit of the good.11
In principle, we even could have let computers decide, but we wanted our
subjects to interact with real people.
The subjects were seated in separate sections of the rooms, facing the wall,
which made it impossible to gather information from their peers. The partici-
pants were not permitted to communicate with each other. The written instruc-
10The instructions for treatments A and B are included in Appendix B. The highly similar
instructions for the last two treatments are available on request.
11Note, that in the ﬁrst session of treatments A and B, subjects were assigned the role
of either buyer or seller. For the sake of a larger database, we then changed to the above
mentioned procedure.
11tions were distributed and read aloud. Questions were asked and answered only
in private.
Each buyer received an initial endowment of 4 Euros per round, which made
sure that their willingness to pay did not exceed the ability to pay. Each seller in
both rounds was endowed with one unit of the good, and additionally received
a show-up fee of 3 Euros at the end of the experiment to compensate for the
possibility of bad luck concerning the qualities of the good.
The experiment started with the ﬁrst market design of the respective treat-
ment. Each buyer made a decision for a price oﬀer and wrote it down on a
prepared form. In each of the two rooms, a separate administrator collected all
the price oﬀers. After this, the administrator endowed the players in his room
with one unit of the good.12 Finally, the price oﬀers were randomly allocated to
the participants in the respective other room. The subjects then acted as sellers
and decided whether to accept or to reject the oﬀer received. Every subject
learned his outcome of the ﬁrst round in private.
Before the second round started, the buyers were asked to write down in
their own words their line of reasoning that lead to their respective price oﬀer.
Then, the second design was carried out the same way as the ﬁrst, and again
subjects verbally described their line of reasoning with respect to the second-
round price oﬀer.13 After the two rounds, the subjects were paid their earnings
in cash. The chosen parameters realized an average payment of about 8 Euros;
the experiment lasted approximately 50 minutes.
Treatments C and D were conducted in a computerized way. Each sub-
ject played 20 repetitions of only one market design, i.e. (comp) or (part). The
subjects were seated and instructed the same way as under treatments A and
B. Each participant typed his decisions into his computer terminal. The designs
(comp) and (part) were exactly the same as under treatments A and B. The pro-
cedures diﬀered only slightly since the subjects stayed in the randomly assigned
role of either buyer or seller during all 20 rounds.14 The buyers were endowed
with 4 ECU (experimental currency unit) per round, the sellers received one
unit of the good (new quality in each round), and 2 ECU per round to com-
pensate for possibly low qualities of the good. In every round, each buyer was
randomly and anonymously matched with one of the sellers. After each round,
12This guaranteed that the quality of the own unit in the role of a seller did not inﬂuence
the own price oﬀer in the role of a buyer.
13To make things easier, the second-round good given to the sellers was of the same quality
as in round one. This was not known to the buyers in the other room. Nevertheless, it is
possible that subjects concluded that the other room faced the same procedure. Therefore,
there is a slight chance that those subjects who traded in round one realized that they already
knew one of the 8 to 10 (depending on session size) possible qualities, i.e. the one they bought
in round one. These subjects then could have updated the expected quality they were facing
in round two. We consider this rather unlikely, or at least negligible, and therefore disregard
this fact in the following.
14Even though the sellers’ situation was of the same simplicity as under treatments A and B,
this appeared reasonable since this experiment was conducted in a computerized way, and we
were afraid of subjects mixing up the two roles if confronted with diﬀerent computer screens
in fast sequence.
12subjects were informed about their own outcome of the precedent round, and
the buyers were asked to write down their reasoning as to prices oﬀered in a
questionnaire.15 After 20 rounds, subjects were paid their earnings in cash.
Thereby, 10 ECU amounted to 1.25 Euros. The sessions lasted approximately
one hour and paid about 10 Euros.
3.2 Predictions for Treatments A and B
3.2.1 Rational Choice Approach
This section summarizes the hypotheses drawn from rational choice theory. The
basic theory of Akerlof, as applied to our experimental setting, allows to derive
the following two null hypotheses:
H1: In the n = 4Q market, only p = 0 is oﬀered (and no trade occurs).
H2: In the n = 1 + 3Q market, only p = 1 is oﬀered (and units with Q < 1=3
are traded, thus E(Q) = 0:17).16
In a rather explorative way, we investigate whether the respective ordering
of (comp) and (part) signiﬁcantly inﬂuences the subjects’ behavior:
H3: Prices on markets of the same type, i.e. prices on (comp) or on (part), do
not diﬀer when oﬀered in the ﬁrst round compared to the second round.
3.2.2 Iterative Reasoning
The above null hypotheses are based on the idea that people perform an inﬁnite
number of iteration steps. Our theory of bounded rationality starts with the
assumption that people tend to make only an inﬁnite number of iteration steps
when choosing their behavior. When deriving the hypotheses for iterative rea-
soning behavior, we refer to the alternative hypotheses of H1 and H2 that state
our conjectures about prices larger than 0, and larger than 1, as well as about
the respective qualities. Additionally, we expect the (part) and (comp) designs
to diﬀer signiﬁcantly in prices and traded qualities, and we therefore derive the
following null hypothesis:
H4.1: Oﬀered prices do not diﬀer in the (comp) design compared to the (part)
design.
H4.2: Traded qualities do not diﬀer in the (comp) design compared to the (part)
design.
15In these treatments, we also let the sellers ﬁll in a similar questionnaire to keep them busy
during the time it took the buyers to ﬁll in their forms.
16Note that, if qualities between 0 an 1/3 are expected to be traded following the prediction
according to the rationality approach, then the mean observed traded quality should be 0.17
since qualities are uniformly distributed.
13Concerning the process of iterative reasoning which we asked our participants
to describe in a written statement after each round, we formulate the next null
hypothesis.
H5: The price oﬀers are not correlated with the iteration type (according to
the verbal statements).
3.3 Results for Treatments A and B
3.3.1 Rational Choice Approach
We ﬁrst describe the data17, and then present the statistical results18 of treat-
ments A, i.e. [part1, comp2], and of treatment B, i.e. [comp1, part2].
First of all, in ﬁgures 3 and 4 appear all price oﬀers in both rounds of treat-
ment A, and ﬁgures 5 and 6 show the prices oﬀered under treatment B.
The bold symbols represent oﬀers rejected by the respective seller (no trade),
the hollow ones symbolize accepted prices (trade). The line represents the sell-
ers’ valuation of their respective quality. For all decisions to be rational, there
should be no bold symbol above the line (this subject did not trade although the
oﬀered price exceeded the value of the own good), and no hollow one beneath
the line (sales price smaller than valuation). As can be seen in ﬁgures 3 to 6
only negligibly few decisions are irrational ones.
Tables 1 and 2 present an overview of the main results of the two treat-
ments.19 We see minimum, maximum, and mean qualities, and price oﬀers, as
well as buyer payoﬀs, and seller payoﬀs under each treatment.
Table 1: Overview of Main Results of Treatment A
Q traded Q p Πb Πs
min .01 .01 .50 2.96 1.00
(part1) mean .51 .34 1.78 4.12 2.05
max 1.00 .92 2.50 6.16 3.00
min .01 .01 .00 2.29 .51
(comp2) mean .51 .30 1.30 3.86 1.28
max 1.00 .92 2.20 6.18 3.00
Let us ﬁrst have a look at the (comp) design. In (comp1) under treatment
B, and in (comp2) under treatment A mean prices amount to 1.32 Euros, and
17The sellers’ payoﬀs Πs do not include the 3 Euros show-up fee. Prices are shown in Euros.
18We have used SigmaStat version 2.0, a statistical software package from SPSS Inc., to
evaluate the data. All statistical tests were conducted to a 5 percent signiﬁcance level. We
use means to describe the data, but refer to medians to test diﬀerences in central tendency.
We thereby use a non-parametric Rank Sum Test, the Mann-Whitney U-Test.
19Note that the number of price-oﬀers is not exactly half of the number of participants in
the respective treatment since, as mentioned above, in the very ﬁrst groups the subjects acted

















accepted offers rejected offers a(Q) = 3Q
Figure 3: Price Oﬀers in (part1)
1.30 Euros respectively. In (comp1), 41% of all prices oﬀered are accepted, an
the mean traded quality is .27. Under (comp2), the acceptance rate is 50% and
a mean quality of .30 is traded. Thus, traded qualities and oﬀered prices are
by far greater than the predicted zero20, and, obviously, the market does not
collapse completely under the (comp) design.
Under (part1), 64% of the price oﬀers are accepted, and the mean price of
1.78 is signiﬁcantly greater than the predicted p = 1.21 The mean traded quality
20A signiﬁcance test is not necessary here, since the deviations from the predicted outcome
are obvious.
21The observed median in (part1) equals 1.8, the theoretically predicted median (theo) is
p = 1, T = 1350 with N(part1) = N(theo) = 50.
Table 2: Overview of Main Results of Treatment B
Q traded Q p Πb Πs
min .00 .00 .00 2.36 .30
(comp1) mean .51 .27 1.32 3.72 1.94
max .98 .54 3.40 4.29 3.40
min .00 .00 .00 2.80 1.00
(part2) mean .51 .35 1.55 4.12 1.97

















accepted prices rejected prices a(Q) = 3Q
Figure 4: Price Oﬀers in (comp2)
of 0.34 is nearly twice as high as the theoretical prediction of 0.17. In (part2),
the observed results are very similar. The acceptance rate is 55%, the mean
price-oﬀer accrues to 1.55 and diﬀers signiﬁcantly22 from the predicted value.
Mean traded quality amounts to 0.35.
Based on this, we have derived our ﬁrst empirical result that prices, and
traded qualities are higher than predicted by rational choice theory:
Result 1: The hypotheses H1 and H2 can be rejected.
Moreover, we see that in both (part) designs the buyers earn an average
payoﬀ of 4.12 Euros. Buyers in (comp)-markets, however, make average losses
from trading which amount to 0.28 and 0.14 Euros, respectively, in comparison
to the 4 Euros endowment.
As to hypothesis H3, we now compare the two treatments and both market
designs with respect to diﬀerences induced by the ordering of market designs. In
treatment A, i.e. [part1, comp2], the average price drops from 1.78 in the ﬁrst
to 1.30 in the second-round play. The ordering [comp1, part2] under treatment
B exhibits an increase in the average price from 1.32 to 1.55. These observations
are qualitatively in line with the theoretical prediction, according to which the
prices are higher under (part) than under (comp). Moreover, mean prices under
design (part) (1.78 in treatment A, and 1.55 in treatment B), as well as prices

















accepted prices rejected prices a(Q) = 3Q
Figure 5: Price Oﬀers in (comp1)
under design (comp) (1.30 and 1.32) do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly.23
However, note that the diﬀerence in prices between (part1) and (part2) is
weakly signiﬁcant at a 10%-level. This indicates that the experience of the
(comp) design in period 1 induces the participants to act more cautiously there-
after. A closer look at the 20 repetitions of (comp) and (part) in section 3.4 will
allow for deeper insight.
Overall, we state that the respective ordering of the market designs does not
inhibit signiﬁcant diﬀerences with respect to price oﬀer behavior.
Result 2: The hypothesis H3 cannot be rejected.
3.3.2 Iterative Reasoning
As was presented above, observed prices and traded qualities in both market
designs are signiﬁcantly higher than theoretically predicted (see Result 1 and
the data in section 3.3.1).
Moreover, design (part) reveals signiﬁcantly higher prices than (comp) in
both periods. Comparing the two ﬁrst-round designs, that is (part1) to (comp1),
as well as both of the second-round designs, we observe a signiﬁcant diﬀerence
23Median(part1) = 1.8, median(part2) = 1.55; T = 2805 with N(part1) = 50, N(part2) =
51, P = 0,084; median (comp1) = median(comp2) = 1.5; T = 2479 with N(comp1) = 51,

















accepted prices rejected prices a(Q) = 3Q
Figure 6: Price Oﬀers in (part2)
in prices in both cases.24 Tables 1 and 2 show the qualities traded in (comp2)
and (part2) which are 0.30 and 0.35. These values are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from each other. The same holds true for the mean quality of 0.34 in (part1),
and 0.27 in (comp1).25 Thus, traded qualities in comp and part do not diﬀer,
and:
Result 3: H4.1 is rejected, but H4.2 cannot be rejected.
Let us now further examine the iterative reasoning process. By drawing on
the subjects’ own description of their way of reasoning, we have derived each
subject’s type k, where k indicates the amount of performed steps of iterative
reasoning.
We sorted the self-descriptions into three categories of types (see Appendix
C for some typical verbal statements of the respective types)26:
² Type 0 describes that he expects a quality out of the interval [0, 1] without
further evaluation of the market situation.
24The median price (part1) is 1.8, median price (comp1) is 1.5, T = 3091, N(part1) = 50,
N(comp1) = 51, P = 0,001. Median price (part2) is 1.55, median price (comp2) is 1.5, T =
2226, N(part2) = 51, N(comp2) = 50, P = 0,028.
25The median quality (part1) is 0.33, median quality (comp1) is 0.27, T = 510.5, N(part1)
= 32, N(comp1) = 21, P = 0,309. Median quality (part2) is 0.29, median quality (comp2) is
0.28, T = 639.5, N(part2) = 28, N(comp2) = 25, P = 0,533.
26Note that subjects can not only develop from type k to type k+1, but also backward,
from e.g. type 2+ to type 0, if so described by themselves. Moreover, we coded the verbal
statements without looking at, i.e. independent of, the oﬀered prices
18² Type 1 expressly mentions to have calculated with an expected quality
equal to 0.5.
² Type 2+ expresses a deeper analysis of the strategic situation on the mar-
ket. The pure Type 2 is aware of the fact that, when assuming E(Q) = 0:5,
no quality higher than a¡1(n(0:5)) will be oﬀered on the market. Thus, the
“updated” expected quality is 0:5(a¡1(n(0:5)). This type consequently of-
fers a lower price. Type 3 even performs one more of these iteration steps,
and so forth. Since most of the subjects’ self-descriptions were not elabo-
rate enough to clearly distinguish, e.g., Type 5 from Type 6, we summarize
all these types into one category called Type 2+.
The following table 3 shows the relation between type and the respective
price interval a speciﬁc type is expected to choose his oﬀer from. This table
only refers to the (comp) market design, that is to n(Q) = 4Q. Note that
the (part) market design (i.e., the one with n(Q) = 1 + 3Q) is less useful for
identifying types, since price intervals start overlapping right from type 1 on.
For that reason, we analyze the types only with respect to the (comp) design.
As was analyzed in more detail in section 2.3, type k expects the quality EQk
on the market. He, therefore, oﬀers at minimum the sellers’ valuation of EQk,
that is a¡1(EQk), and at maximum his own valuation n(EQk).
Table 3: Types and Type-consistent Price Oﬀer Intervals








From type 4 on, the intervals start to overlap. Thus, a clear assignment
of type is only possible for k < 3, or for price oﬀers greater than 0.66. Since
many experimental observations indicate that players either perform 1, 2, 3 or
an inﬁnite number of iteration steps, the setting is suﬃcient to identify the
relevant types.
To sum up, if price oﬀers are chosen consistently with the own verbal de-
scription of the reasoning process types in the (comp) design would oﬀer as
follows:
² Type 0 is expected to oﬀer prices from 0 to 4, since any of these price
oﬀers is consistent with a self-description pointing to this type.
19² Type 1 should choose prices between a(0:5) = 1:5 and n(0:5) = 2, since
he calculates with an expected quality equal to 0.5.
² Type 2+ performs at least 2 steps of iterative reasoning and, therefore,
we expect the oﬀered prices to range from 0 to 1.
Tables 4 and 5 show the prices chosen by types 0 to 2+, where the indicated
price oﬀer intervals correspond to the intervals derived in table 3. Thus, a price
p > 2 - if chosen consistent to the own verbal statement - can only be chosen by
a type 0, and never by subjects who describe themselves as types 1 or 2+. Note
that, on the other hand, type 0 to be consistent with his written descriptions
can choose any price between 0 and 4. Type-consistent prices between 1.5 and
2 indicate a type 1, and prices smaller than 1.5 reveal type 2+ if prices were
chosen consistently.
Table 4: (comp1) by type: 51 observations, 4 descriptions missing
type
price oﬀer interval 0 1 2+ Sum
p > 2 3 0 0 3
1:5 · p · 2 17 10 1 28
p < 1:5 7 2 7 16
Sum 27 12 8 47
Table 5: (comp2) by type: 50 observations, 0 descriptions missing
type
price oﬀer interval 0 1 2+ Sum
p > 2 2 0 0 2
1:5 · p · 2 13 12 0 25
p < 1:5 15 5 3 23
Sum 30 17 3 50
We can see that the likelihood of a low-price oﬀer increases with the type
revealed by the written statements. As to statistical testing, since type 0 is
consistent with any price between 0 and 4, and types 1 and 2+ in our experiment
never chose to oﬀer a price that exceeded 2 Euros we reduced the statistical test
to types 1 and 2+, and prices smaller than 2, i.e. to the bold numbers in
tables 4 and 5. It turns out that in (comp1), types 2+ chose signiﬁcantly lower
prices than types 1; under (comp2) the data point to the same direction and
the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant, too.27 Thus, the data allow to draw the conclusion:
27Under (comp1), the Chi-square value is 9.731, and p = 0,002; under (comp2), the Chi-
square value amounts to 6.107, and p = 0,013.
20Result 4: H5 can be rejected.
3.3.3 Eﬃciency Considerations
In section 3.3.2, we presented the conclusion that bounded rational behavior on
the two diﬀerent lemon markets prevented their complete or partial collapse. In
the following, table 6 summarizes who proﬁted or lost from trade.
Table 6: Eﬃciency, or Gains from Trade in Euros
design max buyers sellers b + s theory
(part1) 50.0 6.1 25.9 32.0 16.7
(comp2) 25.5 -6.9 14.5 7.6 0.0
(comp1) 26.3 -14.3 20.0 5.7 0.0
(part2) 51.0 6.4 22.6 28.0 17.0
The ﬁrst column ”max” in table 6 shows maximum possible eﬃciency if every
unit of the good had been sold. Columns ”buyers” and ”sellers” describe the
totalled gains from trade in Euros of buyers and sellers under each design. The
buyers’ gains under each design amount to Σ(n(Q)¡p), i.e. to their totalled sin-
gle valuations of the bought quality minus the prices they paid. The respective
sellers in total gained Σ(p¡a(Q)) from the sold units. Column ”b + s” gives the
sum of net realized gains from trade under each design, i.e. the sum of ”buyers”
+ ”sellers”. Finally, the last column indicates the eﬃciency that should have
been realized according to the predictions from rational choice theory. Since
under (comp) no trade is predicted, the gains from trade theoretically expected
equal zero. In (part) markets, the eﬃciency gain per transaction is 1 Euro,
i.e. buyer’s minus seller’s valuation. In theory, under uniform distribution of
quality, the players achieve this gain with probability 1=3. Therefore, expected
gains should amount to 33% of maximum possible eﬃciency.
Table 6 shows that the realized eﬃciency, i.e. the sum of net realized gains
from trade, amounts to 64% of the maximum possible under (part1), and to 55%
in (part2). And, as can be seen, both sellers and buyers overall proﬁted from
trade under (part). As to the (comp) market, the data also reveal that sellers
and buyers proﬁted in an overall perspective. But, in contrast to the moderate
(part) design, net proﬁts arise at the buyers’ expenses who, as a whole, lose an
amount of 6.9 Euros under (comp2), and of 14.3 Euros under (comp1). The
realized percentage of eﬃciency ranges low from 30% to 22%. We, therefore,
can conclude that the (comp) design might justify regulation and consumers’
protection (i.e. buyers’ protection) in real world markets.
213.4 Repeated Play in Treatments C and D
In the experiment described in section 3.3, the lemon markets did not collapse as
predicted. In the (comp) design, a positive number of transactions was observed,
and in the (part) design, more transactions than predicted took place, too. We
have explained this deviation from the perfect rationality predictions by a theory
of bounded rationality that is based on iterative thinking.
To a great extent, the subjects seem to have performed only a limited number
of iterative steps and, therefore, they oﬀered prices that were signiﬁcantly larger
than predicted by rational choice theory. This leaves the question unanswered
whether our results in section 3.3 are caused by the limitation to only one
round per market design, and whether subjects learn to perform more than one
iterative step when playing several repetitions. After all, it is widely known in
Experimental Economics that repeated play usually shows a tendency toward
the theoretical equilibrium behavior.
Hence, we conducted two more treatments in which we let subjects play 20
rounds of either the (comp) design - called treatment C - or the (part) design -
subsequently denoted as treatment D. Since treatments C and D only serve the
purpose of correctly interpreting the 2-round data of treatments A and B, we
restrict the analysis in this section to the interpretation of the descriptive data.
Table 7 presents some basic data of treatments C and D with respect to
qualities and prices, as well as to the payoﬀs of buyers Πb and of sellers Πs. The
data is highly aggregate that is, table 7 shows 31 observations under treatment C
and 30 observations under treatment D. One observation accounts for one seller
oﬀering prices in 20 rounds (and being 20 times randomly and anonymously
matched with a seller). Under treatment C, 31% of price oﬀers during all 20
rounds were accepted. Treatment D shows an acceptance rate of 53% of all prices
oﬀered. This observation clearly is in line with the data under treatments A
and B presented above.
Table 7: Basic Data from 20 Rounds in Treatments C and D
Q p Πb Πs
min .00 .00 1.00 2.00
C mean .49 .93 3.81 3.75
max 1.00 3.30 5.33 5.30
min .00 .00 2.32 2.21
D mean .50 1.58 4.09 3.93
max 1.00 3.00 6.94 5.99
Figure 7 pictures the development of mean prices over 20 rounds. Even
after 20 repetitions of the (comp), as well as of the (part) lemon market design,
markets still do not collapse to the extent predicted by rational choice theory.
On the (comp) market, the mean price ﬁnally oscillates around .60 during the
22last seven rounds which is by far more than the theoretically predicted zero
price. Under the (part) design, the mean price seems quite stable at about 1.5
for the second half of the experiment. Again, this exceeds the predicted p = 1
even after many repetitions. Moreover, as was already visible under treatment
B when testing hypothesis H3 in section 3.3.1, prices decline both more rapidly
and to a larger extent under the (comp) than under the (part) design. Obviously,
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Figure 7: Price Oﬀers in Treatments C and D
Overall, mean prices tend to decrease over time under both treatments, so
the data suggest that the participants experience a learning eﬀect. In the light
of our theory of bounded rationality, this indicates an increase in the level of
reasoning with the number of rounds played. We learn from ﬁgures 8 and 9 the
percentage of types 0 to 2+ on the two markets. 28
Indeed, type 2+ becomes more frequent from round to round in both markets.
The percentage goes up to about 30% of types 2+ in the last third of the two
treatments, which is in line with the quite stable mean prices from period 14 on
in ﬁgure 7. Thus, a ”learning eﬀect” as to development in direction of type 2+
is clearly visible which most probably accounts for the decreasing prices.
Moreover, under treatment C, during the whole 20 rounds there is a stable
percentage of about 60% to 70% of subjects of type 0. Types 1 very quickly
almost vanish from the market and constitute only a small share of 5% from
28Please remember, that subjects can not only develop from type k to type k+1 over time,
but also backward, from e.g. type 2+ to type 0, if so described by themselves. Of course, we
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Figure 8: Percentage of Types on (comp) Market in 20 Rounds
round 11 on. Figure 9 of treatment D, ﬁnally, reveals that one half of the
subjects on that market made up of type 0. The share of types 2+ is almost
of the same size as in the (comp) market, but the percentage of types 1 at
about 25% from round 5 on is astonishingly high, compared to (comp). This
might be due to the fact that the buyers’ losses are much more painful under
(comp) than under the relatively moderate (part) design, where 1 ECU surplus
per transaction is guaranteed even if the purchase is of zero quality. The results
point to the fact that the higher pressure in (comp) markets forces the subjects
to deeper thoughts. This results in types 1 changing to either type 2+ when
the thinking process was successful, or - more often - in changing to type 0 and
facing the gamble. Under (part), on the contrary, staying type 1 is not that
painful with respect to losses from trade, and careful thinking is not as much
enforced by bad experience as in the (comp) market.
4 Conclusion
The collapse of markets that suﬀer from asymmetric information is an inspiring
theoretical phenomenon. If, however, bounded rationality (in the form of limited
iterative reasoning) of the uninformed market participants is taken into account,
the ineﬃciency of the theoretical result might be greatly exaggerated. If market
failure only occurs in theory, but not in reality, institutional means (such as
mandatory insurance, warranties, eﬀort into building of reputation...) based on
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Figure 9: Percentage of Types on (part) Market in 20 Rounds
theory might go too far or be too costly, and may perhaps do even more harm
than good.
This friendly policy implication of our results suﬀers, however, from a serious
drawback: successfully completed transactions may inﬂict losses upon the re-
spective buyers. After the completion of a transaction, the actual quality of the
respective item is revealed. Some buyers may then realize that their valuation
of the purchased item is lower than the price they had oﬀered. They submit-
ted their oﬀer based on false (i.e., overly optimistic) expectations. In such a
case, a concluded transaction is only a Kaldor-Hicks-improvement, but not a
Pareto-improvement. If the buyers were perfectly rational buyers, they would
let the market collapse, avoiding such losses. Therefore, potential buyers who
are boundedly rational might be interested in a regulation that protects them
from completing harmful transactions in lemon markets.
Comparing the two market settings, we can - cautiously - interpret the (comp)
design as a lemon market without warranty, while the (part) design is one with
partial coverage. Full insurance (like a quality preserving warranty) implies
that the buyer’s net income from purchasing a car is constant, irrespective of its
actual quality. The results show that partial warranty may lead to higher prices
and a higher number of transactions as a means against asymmetric information.
Note that this impact of insurance is not driven by a signaling eﬀect, nor does
it depend on risk-aversion on the side of the buyers.
According to our design, the potential buyers were able to make a take-
it or leave-it oﬀer to the respective seller. Under complete information, this
25would provide the buyers with a chance to capture the complete cooperation
rent. Numerous experiments have demonstrated, however, that ﬁrst-movers in
ultimatum games do not exploit their position to the fullest, since they have
to be aware of possible rejections (which, in principle, are irrational). In our
experiment, the buyers were also unable to capture the cooperation rent, but
here this was due to the asymmetric information.29 Even worse, under bounded
rationality, the buyers even made expected losses that were captured by the
sellers. Thus, the second movers turned out to have an extremely strong position
in our experiment. The chance to make a take-it or leave-it oﬀer that is usually
clouded only by fear of rejection, can even turn into a disadvantage if the ﬁrst-
mover is the uninformed party.
Iterative thinking, the mixed implications of bounded rationality for eco-
nomic policy, the eﬀect of partial warranty on the willingness to conclude trans-
actions, and ﬁnally the game-theoretic implications of asymmetric information
for ﬁrst-movers in ultimatum games deserve further exploration.
29Note that in our ultimatum game the ﬁrst-mover did not demand a share of a given
“cake”. He rather demanded a slice of a given size from a cake the size of which was unknown
to him. In the ultimatum game with complete information, this distinction may be irrelevant,
but under asymmetric information this seems to be crucial.
26Appendix A
Proof of the Proposition
Let us ﬁrst derive the condition for an optimal price in a general framework.
Recall that sellers value quality Q with a(Q) = ¯Q, while the buyers value
quality with n(Q) = ° + ±Q. We assume ° ¸ 0 and ± ¸ ¯ > 0. We can
disregard price oﬀers p > ¯ since they are strictly dominated by p = ¯. For any



















































The ﬁrst derivative is positive if ± > 2¯. In such a parameter constellation,
the corner solution p = ¯ maximizes the buyer’s payoﬀ, which proves our third
result.
If, on the other hand, ± < 2¯, then an internal maximum may exist, as the
second-order condition demonstrates. The ﬁrst derivative equals zero if
1. ° = 0 and p = 0, or
2. ° = 0 and ± = 2¯, or
3. if p = ¯°
2¯ ¡ ±.
The ﬁrst case covers our parameter constellation 1: with ° = 0 and ¯ < ± < 2¯,
the maximum payoﬀ is obtained with p = 0. This result establishes our predic-
tion according to which the market collapses completely under this parameter
constellation.
The second case violates the second-order-condition for a maximum, ± < 2¯.
27The third case relates to our second parameter constellation: ° > 0 and ¯ = ±.
Here, the second-oder condition for a maximum is fulﬁlled, and the ﬁrst-oder








This establishes our second result, according to which the market collapses only
partially.
Appendix B
The Basic Instructions for Buyers30
You are taking part in an economic experiment. Each participant makes his
decisions isolated from the others and enters them into an answer-sheet. Com-
munication between participants is not allowed. Male forms like ”he” will be
used gender-neutral.
In the experiment, there are two types of players, ”buyers” and ”sellers”. These
roles are randomly assigned to the participants. You are a ”buyer” and you
will stay in this role during the whole experiment. In your room, there are only
”buyers”, in the other room there are only ”sellers”.31 The experiment consists
of 2 rounds. In each of the two rounds, one seller interacts with one buyer. In
both rounds anew, buyers and sellers will be matched randomly. Even after the
experiment you will not be informed about who you traded with. In each round,
each seller is endowed with one unit of good X, and each buyer has 4 Euros at
his disposal. In each of the two rounds, the situation is as follows: The sellers
oﬀer their X. Each unit of good X has a certain quality that is only known to its
seller. The qualities of X are uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1], that is
each quality between 0 and 1 is equiprobable. Thus, 0 indicates the worst and
1 the best quality. This probability distribution is known to both, buyers and
sellers. The actual quality of a unit of good X is labelled Q.
Each buyer in each round starts with an amount of money of 4 Euros. The
buyers value good quality higher than bad quality. The valuation of a certain
quality in Euros is described by a function n(Q). The exact shape of the function
n(Q) will be explained later in the instructions.32 No buyer can discover
the real quality prior to his decision to buy; he only knows the probability
distribution of quality. Not until after a purchase, each buyer learns about the
real Q of his unit of X.
After each round, the buyers are credited a payoﬀ following this rule:33
30When the sellers’ instruction diﬀers from the buyers’ we use a footnote to show what was
told to the sellers instead.
31Exchange ”sellers” and ”buyers”.
32This function n(Q) is only known to the buyers - you as a seller do not know n(Q).
33If trade has taken place at price p the seller gets p Euros. If no trade has taken place
28² If trade has taken place at price p, the buyer gets 4 ¡ p + n(Q) Euros,
² If no trade has taken place, the buyer gets 4 Euros.
As to the sellers, the function a(Q) = 3Q denotes their value of good X in Euros:
If X is not sold, the seller receives an amount of a(Q) Euros. If, in contrast, a
seller sells his X, he obtains the respective sales price.34 The totalled payoﬀs of
the two rounds are the earnings of buyers and sellers.
Each round passes as follows:
1. First, the buyer makes his decision and enters his proposal for a sales price
in his form (there are separate forms for each of the two rounds). All forms
will then be collected by the experiment supervisor and will randomly be
distributed to the sellers in the other room. Each seller gets exactly one
form.
2. Each seller has been assigned a certain quality. Now, he decides whether
or not he wants to sell his unit X at the price proposed by the buyer. He
enters this decision in the form. In case of sale, he also enters the actual
quality of the unit sold.
3. Again, the forms will be collected by the experiment supervisor and given
back to the respective buyer. If a purchase has taken place, the buyer is
informed about the real quality of the good X he bought.
4. By doing so, a round is ﬁnished.
5. After the two rounds, each player gets paid the totalled payoﬀs in cash.
Instructions Buyers, 1. round35
Your subject number is:
During this round, the situation on the X-market is as follows:
² Each buyer owns exactly 4 Euros, each seller owns exactly one unit X.
² The buyer’s valuation of the quality of good X in the ﬁrst round is n(Q) =
1 + 3Q. Thus, for example, one unit of good X with quality Q = 0.7 is
worth n(0:7) = 3:1 Euros to each buyer.
² The sellers value X by a(Q) = 3Q. Therefore, the same unit is worth
a(0:7) = 2:1 Euros to the seller.
the seller gets a(Q) Euros. Furthermore, each seller gets a show-up fee of 3 Euros for
participating in this experiment.
34The sellers’ valuation of a certain quality in Euros is described by the function a(Q) = 3Q.
If X is not sold the seller receives an amount of a(Q) Euros at the end of that round. On the
contrary, if he sells X he obtains the respective sales price.
35The instructions for the second round are the same, except for the altered n(Q) which










We assume a buyer to purchase an X at price p = 2:4 Euros, and the real quality
of that X to be Q = 0:3. Thus, p > n(Q). Then, the buyer receives an amount
of (4 ¡ 2:4 + 1:9) = 3:5 Euros out of this round. If, in contrast, he buys this
unit (with Q = 0:3) at price p = 1:1 Euros, then p < n(Q). His earnings will
then be (4 - 1.1 + 1.9) Euros = 4.8 Euros.
Instructions Sellers, both rounds
Your subject number is:
At the beginning of both rounds you own a unit of good X.
The quality of this good is: Q =
Your receive a price oﬀer in each of the two rounds. Decide then, whether to
decline (in this case you receive your valuation a(Q) = 3Q) or to accept the
price.
Enter your decision in the oﬀer form. In case of a sale, please enter your quality
Q truthfully in the form (then you receive the sales price)
Example:
If a seller owns an X of quality Q = 0:7, and he does not sell it he gets 2.1
Euros.
If he sells his X at price p = 3 Euros he receives an amount of 3 Euros after
that round.








Oﬀer Form (Round 1)
The decision of a buyer
Your subject number is:
My price oﬀer:
I want to buy one unit X at price p = .
The decision of a seller Your subject number is (please ﬁll in!):
My decision :
( ) I decline the oﬀer.
( ) I accept. My unit X has the quality Q = .
The Questionnaire
Description of sellers’ reasoning: Your subject number is:
Please, brieﬂy describe the reasoning that led to your particular proposal of the




Here, we present some typical verbal statements of our participants.
Type 0 is supposed to not even calculate with an expected quality of 1/2. Some
of the written statements that we coded as types 0 are for example:
² ”I chose p such that quality gets better”,
² ”I had no idea, I just gambled”,
² ”Seller only sells if p > 3Q; my choice was arbitrary - best choice would
have been 1 Cent above 3Q”,
² ”defensive behavior - better be left with the good on my hands”,
² ”I analyzed what the seller’s quality must be, compared to my price oﬀer”,
² ”Proﬁts rise with higher risk - no alternative seems to have decisive ad-
vantages, so I chose the middle course”.
Type 1 is expected to calculate explicitly with an expected quality of 1/2. Some
examples are:
² ”E(Q) = 1=2 and a(Q) = 1:5; thus, my oﬀer is 1.51”,
² ”Since Q is uniformly distributed, I calculated with Q < 1=2 (risk-averse).
Because a(Q) = 3Q, I chose p = 1:5”,
² ”With E(Q) = :5 a price p = 1:5 is accepted with probability 1/2”,
² “I calculated with E(Q) = :5 and wanted to make some proﬁts”,
Finally, type 2+ performs at least one more step of iterative reasoning than
type 1. Therefore, type 2+ knows that the conditional expected quality clearly
is smaller than 1/2 and a loss is to be expected with too high a price. Some
examples (from the (part) market) are:
² ”I compared possible gains and losses in a table; the chance to win is 1:3
compared to the chance to lose; this is too risky”,
² ”The possible loss is always higher than the possible gain; thus, on average
there is always a loss”,
² ”The expected gains are always smaller than 0; an oﬀer is advantageous
only if the slope of n(Q) is at least twice as much as the slope of a(Q)”,
² ”e.g., at p = 1:6 seller sells Q < 0:5: with Q = :5 proﬁts of 40 cents, with
Q = :4 zero proﬁts, with Q = :3 loss of 40 cents, and so on; thus, there is
a negative expected proﬁt”,
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